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Abstract: The paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it provides what appears to be 
the first game-theoretic modelling of Napoléon’s last campaign, which ended 
dramatically on 18 June 1815 at Waterloo. It is specifically concerned with the decision 
Napoléon made on 17 June 1815 to detach part of his army and send it against the 
Prussians, whom he had defeated, though not destroyed, on 16 June at Ligny. Military 
strategists and historians agree that this decision was crucial but disagree about whether it 
was rational. Hypothesizing a zero-sum game between Napoléon and Blücher, and 
computing its solution, we show that dividing his army could have been a cautious 
strategy on Napoléon’s part, a conclusion which runs counter to the charges of 
misjudgment commonly heard since Clausewitz. On the other hand, the paper addresses 
some methodological issues relative to “analytic narratives”. Some political scientists and 
economists who are both formally and historically minded have proposed to explain 
historical events in terms of properly mathematical game-theoretic models. We liken the 
present study to this “analytic narrative” methodology, which we defend against some of 
objections that it has aroused. Generalizing beyond the Waterloo case, we argue that 
military campaigns provide an especially good opportunity for testing this new 
methodology. 
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First deployed in economics, the mathematical theories of rational choice – individual 
decision theory, game theory, social choice theory – have spread abundantly beyond their 
original realm. Certain schools of sociology and political science have aligned themselves 
with the use of such theoretical devices, sparking controversies that have become 
academic topoi in their respective disciplines. By contrast, history has offered strong 
resistance. Historians have not simply been unwilling to make use of these mathematical 
theories, they have been disinclined even to consider their potential, even to dismiss it. 
And this despite efforts that have been made to shake them out of their indifference. Both 
economics and political science have historically oriented subsections, which attempt to 
model historical events using the mathematical theories in question, with game theory 
generally occupying center stage. A major example is the game-theoretic work long 
pursued among political scientists as a means to analyze pivotal events in international 
relations, such as the outbreak of World War I or the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.1 More 
recently, a group of scholars, again from political science and economics (Bates, Greif, 
Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast, 1998), have proposed an original reconciliation of the 
narrative form of history with the modeling form permitted by mathematical theories of 
rational choice. For this reconciliation, they propose the surprising and apparently 
oxymoronic tag “analytic narratives”, which also provides the title for their book. Their 
five cases are drawn from institutional history: international regulation of the coffee trade 
in the 20th Century (Bates), municipal conflicts in medieval Genoa, conscription laws in 
19th-Century Europe (Greif), tax systems in prerevolutionary Europe (Rosenthal), and the 
entry of new states to the American federation (Weingast). These cases represent 
challenges to economics and political science as well as to history, but one can detach 
what specifically concerns the latter.2 In brief, the authors think of some historical events 
                                                 
1 The 1914 crisis has been explored in game-theoretic detail by Zagare (2011). Regarding the Cuban crisis, 
the classic study by Allison (1971) was quickly followed by more advanced game-theoretic studies (one of 
the first being by Brams, 1975, ch. 1). Of lesser historical relevance are the many game-theoretic pieces 
written on deterrence in general, as in Schelling (1960) and followers. See O’Neill (1994) for early 
references along both lines. 
2 Bates et al. (1998) push analytic narratives in two directions at once, i.e., historical explanation and the 
neo-institutionalist analysis of institutional change (along the same lines as North, 1990). Here we interpret 
them only in the former sense, which the authors’ own division of the issues permits (see their 
methodological introduction). Zagare (2011, 2015) and Brams (2011) understand the expression “analytic 
narratives” in the same way.  
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as raising interpretative and explanatory problems that cannot be resolved by narratives in 
classical form, and thus call for the importing of models – in their case, from the theory 
of games under extensive form. “Analytic narrative” thus refers to the change in the 
narrative genre that results from this importation. The proposed method cannot be said to 
be entirely new, given the aforementioned work in international relations, but the authors 
provide a clearer account of it than their predecessors.3 
 
It is indeed an understatement to say that historians have expressed little interest in the 
proposal. In our experience, few are even aware of this brave attempt by rational choice 
modelers at bridging the gap with them.4 This is all the more distressing since the 
illustrative studies carefully avoid irrelevant technicalities and make good reading. 
Although initiated independently of the analytic narrative project, the present work offers 
a partial answer to this communication problem. We also explore a specific historical 
event, not generalities; we adopt the formal mode of rational choice theory (more 
specifically game theory: although not games in extensive form); and finally we propose 
that narratives be reconciled with models. Given all these features, our work belongs to 
the analytic narrative genre. At the same time, it departs from the precedent set by Bates 
et al. by its choice of historical case. Ours is much more limited in scope, and avowedly 
less innovative than theirs; but we will try to turn this apparent lack of ambition into an 
asset, seeking to show that the gap with historians can be bridged more easily with 
studies of this kind. 
 
Our historical case is Napoléon’s last campaign in June 1815, which he eventually lost to 
Wellington and Blücher on the battlefield of Waterloo. One reason we had for turning to 
military studies is that they have often served as a touchstone for rational choice 
explanations. For instance, Pareto (1917-1919, §152) classes them alongside economic 
and technological studies as those which embody his concept of “logical action”. Within 
military studies overall, the account of military campaigns appears to be the most 
amenable to simple rational choice explanations: for example Weber (1922a, p. 10; Eng. 
                                                 
3 Besides the 1998 introduction, see Bates et al. (2000) and the further elucidations in Levi (2002, 2004).  
4 A rare counterexample is the review published in History and Theory by Downing (2000). 
 4
ed. p. 21) had this branch in mind when he illustrated his “instrumental rationality” ideal-
type by Moltke’s and Benedek’s cogitations before the Sadowa battle. Even more clearly, 
since Jomini and Clausewitz founded the genre in the 19th Century, the authors of 
campaign narratives themselves have given substance to the view that military campaigns 
have a special susceptibility to rational choice explanation. 
 
Capitalizing on such a well-understood connection, the analytic narrative of a military 
campaign could hope to relate to the preexisting body of historical work more easily than 
analytic narratives with more complex historical subjects. As a supporting argument for 
our choice of topic, some of the technical concepts of game theory – beginning with that 
of the strategy – obviously relate to the informal concepts used by the actors and 
narrators themselves. Admittedly, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) themselves did 
not pay attention to military affairs,5 but their immediate post-war followers at the RAND 
Corporation and in US military organizations certainly did.6 These followers initiated the 
long-lasting alliance between game theory and deterrence studies. Yet concerning war 
itself, rather than the ways of avoiding it, applications were surprisingly scarce. The most 
relevant one is a little-known application by Haywood (1950, 1954), a US general who 
analyzed two strategic decisions made in World War II in terms of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s zero-sum two-person games with mixed strategies.7 Our model will also 
resort to this basic tool. 
 
Applications like these pay for their didactic facility with a clear disadvantage: they do 
not have the same demonstrative consequences as if they had taken on less tractable 
topics like medieval Genoa or the finances of prerevolutionary France.8 For the present 
work, so be it. We will more easily renew the debate on analytic narratives, and in 
particular draw in historians, if our chosen starting point is relatively consensual. At the 
end of the day, we would be satisfied if we also achieved consensus on the bare 
                                                 
5 Von Neumann and Morgenstern took their basic examples from parlor games; see Leonard (2010). 
6 See, e.g., Erikson et al. (2013). 
7 The two decisions analyzed by Haywood belong to the US Pacific campaign and the US Normandy 
campaign, respectively. Despite Brams’s efforts (1975, ch. 1), which breathed new life into Haywood’s 
work, this interesting precursor has remained virtually unnoticed. 
8 This objection was put to us by Margaret Levi; we try to answer it here and later in the text. 
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existential point that there is at least one class of indisputable applications of game theory 
to historical events, however unsurprising this class may seem. 
 
Within the class of military campaigns, our specific case is itself scarcely original. An old 
chestnut from the strategy courses of military staff colleges in the 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, Napoléon’s 1815 campaign has remained a subject of inexhaustible fascination 
for war historians up to the present. The rich bibliography in three major languages is 
certainly one attraction of the case, but an even stronger one is that, despite the 
availability of so much evidence, historians have been unable to come to agreement on 
why Napoléon experienced such a stupendous disaster. More precisely, what they 
disagree on is the rationality of this prominent actor. The role of game-theoretic 
modeling will thus be to illuminate and perhaps to arbitrate this disagreement. The issue 
goes back to an account the overthrown emperor dictated to his companions in exile on 
Sainte-Hélène, which was a plea pro domo. Among the texts which record this account, 
we have selected Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène by Las Cases, which is the most widely 
distributed and the most succinct.9 Napoléon lays the blame for his defeat with marshals 
Grouchy and Ney, who he claims misjudged their strategic possibilities and did not 
properly follow his instructions. Clausewitz, however, who had access to the Mémorial as 
well as further French and German sources, reached the opposing conclusion that 
Napoléon should not be exculpated. The first genuine scholar of the Waterloo campaign, 
Clausewitz is also a passionate critic of Napoléon’s handling of it. With various nuances, 
his position has carried the day; but the imperial argument, long upheld by French 
military writers, has not disappeared altogether. One finds it even today, and not only 
within France, endorsed by authors with sufficient credentials that it seems no less worth 
considering than the dominant view. So historians are in a deadlock, and after so much 
time there seems to be little hope that progress will be made – unless one radically 
changes perspective. This is how we defend the shift to an analytic narrative. 
 
                                                 
9 Las Cases includes “Relation de la campagne de Waterloo, dictée par Napoléon” in Mémorial de Sainte-
Hélène under the date of 26 August 1816. The other reports are Gourgaud’s La campagne de 1815 and 
Bertrand’s Cahiers de Sainte-Hélène. The last work was published long after its author’s death and played 
no role in the Waterloo controversy, unlike the first two which came out in 1823 and 1818 respectively. 
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Clausewitz’s interpretation is to be found in the monograph The Campaign of 1815 in 
France, which his famous treatise On War has regrettably overshadowed.10 In it, one can 
find an anticipated use of Weber’s principle of instrumental rationality (henceforth, we 
say simply “the rationality principle”). By contrast, the concepts of ends and means that 
direct the classic definitions of war in the treatise are part of a more abstract teleology, 
which unlike the Weberian concept is detached from acting individuals. A great merit of 
the monograph is that, while following the principle of rationality throughout, it now and 
then surpasses the level of informality at which historians normally stop, suggesting 
models in the sense relevant here. We will in fact rebut Clausewitz’s substantive 
interpretation of Waterloo, but praise his method, registering him as a definite precursor 
of the analytic narrative genre. It is a secondary contribution of the present paper to 
highlight an aspect of his work that does not seem to have been noticed. 
 
The rest of the paper develops as follows. Section 2 reviews the main facts and 
interpretations of the Waterloo campaign, emphasizing those which matter for the model 
to follow. It will touch only lightly on the tactical aspects of the battles, and focus rather 
on the overall strategy pursued by Napoléon during the three days from 16 to 18 June 
1815. This section intentionally reproduces the standard narrative mode of military 
historians. 
 
Section 3 changes tone, proposing a model for Napoléon’s crucial decision on 17 June 
1815, the day after his victory over Blücher on 16 June at Ligny. That day he chose to 
send more than a third of his forces, under the command of Grouchy, against the 
retreating Prussians. All the historians agree that this division of the French army was the 
key to Wellington’s victory on 18 June at Waterloo. Grouchy spent the fateful day at 
Wavre, baited by Blücher’s rear guard, while the advance guard marched unimpeded to 
join Wellington in the midst of a still uncertain battle. The greatest question of the 
campaign, which involves Napoléon’s rationality, is whether he could have made better 
                                                 
10 Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Posthumous like the others, this work appeared in 1835 in the 
Hinterlassene Werke edited by Marie von Clausewitz; it was written in 1827. Clausewitz’s commentators 
do not spend much time on his campaign narratives. Aron (1976), for example, hardly mentions them, 
while Paret (1992, ch.9) is somewhat derogatory about them. 
 7
use of Grouchy’s detachment. The model we propose to answer this question takes the 
form of a zero-sum game between Napoléon and Blücher. Despite the absence of 
Grouchy as an autonomous player, it adds precision to the competing hypotheses. In the 
end, we will side with the proNapoleonic minority against the antiNapoleonic majority 
led by Clausewitz. In favoring this conclusion, we exemplify the connection between 
rational choice theories and the charity principle, which requires considering an agent's 
reasons for an action in their strongest and most plausible form before evaluating them.11 
 
Section 4 returns to analytic narratives, first summarizing the objections raised against 
them, and then examining how our model could possibly withstand them. At the same 
time, we take up the argument sketched in this introduction that the analytic narrative 
methodology can fruitfully be applied to military events, and particularly campaigns. The 
section will argue that this is a plausible application because some standard assumptions 
of formal rational choice theories appear to be satisfied in this context, and there is a 
continuum of rationalizations between the spontaneous ones evinced by the actors and 
those analytically developed by the modelers. Section 5 concludes, adding a brief 
comparison between analytic narratives and cliometrics. 
 
2. The Waterloo Campaign: main facts and interpretations 
 
In the spring of 1815, a coalition of the European powers was solidifying against France. 
Napoléon needed to annihilate the two armies already mounted – the English and the 
Prussian – as quickly as possible. Against Wellington’s 93,000 Anglo-Dutch soldiers, 
who were preparing to meet Blücher’s 118,000 Prussians in Belgium before invading 
France, Napoléon had only the 124,000 troops of the Armée du nord; his other forces 
covered the Rhine or garrisoned fortresses. The only way out was to reproduce his 
masterstroke from the Italian campaign: first defeat one army, then the other. All 
historians recognize this plan, and most of them, including Clausewitz, hold that it was 
                                                 
11 Davidson (1980) is famous for emphasizing this connection. 
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the only one conceivable.12 At first, the execution seemed promising. With his customary 
swiftness, Napoléon entered Charleroi on 15 June, forcing the Prussian advance guard to 
pull back northeast of the city. The allies had not yet joined forces, and each of them was 
in a rather unsatisfactory state. The Anglo-Dutch were widely spread out around Brussels 
and westward, as Wellington wanted at all costs to maintain communications with Ostend 
in that direction.13 And Blücher was headquartered in Sombreffe, some 12 kilometers 
northeast of Charleroi, with only three corps; a fourth, commanded by Bülow, kept the 
rear guard and was useless for battle. In taking this forward position Blücher ran the risk 
of confronting Napoléon with insufficient forces. However, his decision becomes clearer 
in the light of the agreement he had reached with Wellington on May 3, to the effect that 
the allies would meet on the Quatre-Bras-Sombreffe line in the case of an offensive by 
Napoléon. This strategy ran afoul of the classical precept of maximal grouping before the 
engagement, but Blücher apparently believed that Wellington would join him in the heat 
of the battle. 
 
The Prussians had occupied the hamlet of Ligny, which gave its name to the battle that 
they ended up fighting there alone over the afternoon and early evening of 16 June. Less 
famous than that of 18 June, this battle actually determined the succeeding chain of 
events, and it is with regards to its interpretation that the main hypotheses square off. The 
Campaign, to quote but one account, gives more space and emphasis to Ligny than it 
does to Waterloo. 
 
Napoléon immediately recognized that Blücher’s risky strategy offered him an 
opportunity to carry out his campaign plan. He won on 16 June following the two 
standard criteria of victory: lose fewer men than the adversary, and conquer the terrain of 
the battlefield. While very real, this victory was not yet decisive. Blücher managed to 
save most of his forces, some 90,000 men, in sufficient order to bring them back to his 
rear guard. So Blücher’s initial error – leaving Bülow in reserve – would eventually turn 
                                                 
12 La campagne de France en 1815, tr. Niessel, 1973, p. 37-43. From now on, all page references to 
Clausewitz are to his monograph and this French version, from which we translated the quotations. 
13 Hofschröer (1998-1999) stresses that Wellington had weakened himself in order to prepare for an attack 
from the west, which there was little reason to expect. The Duke had already faced the charge in his 
reaction to Clausewitz; see Bassford (1994, p. 42-45, and 2001 for a transcript of Wellington’s comments). 
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to his and Wellington’s advantage. In the Mémorial, Napoléon implies that the three 
Prussian corps engaged at Ligny escaped destruction through Ney’s fault.14 In fact, he 
had sent the marshal away in the north-west direction with the principal objective of 
holding the road from Charleroi to Brussels, which Wellington would have to use if he 
came in support of Blücher. Ney’s group – about 25,000 men under his direct command – 
had the option of either attacking the Anglo-Dutch, or simply holding them back while 
taking on the Prussians from behind. The Mémorial mentions both tasks at once, which 
was probably too much to ask of poor Ney. At the field of Quatre-Bras, where he met the 
English forward guard, he carried out the former slowly and awkwardly, not even 
considering the latter. The corps of Drouet d’Erlon – 20,000 more men – was to come to 
Ligny or Quatre-Bras in case of need, but wandered pitifully from field to field without 
engaging; many have seen this as a turning point in the campaign.  
 
Clausewitz defends Ney by arguing that the successive orders that Soult, the campaign’s 
chief of staff, sent him in the name of the Emperor were incompatible. This analysis, 
which we will not develop here, brings out the rationality principle most clearly: “Ney 
absolutely completed his goals – to block the aid of Wellington. Bonaparte did not come 
to the idea of having him cooperate in the battle of Ligny until later, after having 
recognized Blücher’s position…. Only today can we see [what Ney could have done], by 
bringing into our calculations all the fortuitous circumstances that could not be foreseen 
at the time” (Clausewitz, p. 105). Weber would do no better than this in distinguishing 
between objective rationality, which can be defined only by the retrospective observer, 
and subjective rationality, which is the only one accessible to the actors, and hence the 
only one pertinent for explaining their actions.15  
 
Starting a movement that would turn out to be decisive, the Prussians did not back up 
along their natural line of communication, which was the Meuse river valley, but went 
farther northward, in the general direction of Louvain. They regrouped over the course of 
June at Wavre, a town situated on the river Dyle, mid-way between Ligny and Louvain. 
                                                 
14 Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, Garnier reprint, p. 237 (all page references to this edition). 
15 Cf. Weber (1922b, p. 435-439). The distinction between objective and subjective rationality has since 
become established; see, e.g., Popper’s (1967) classic restatement. 
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This location allowed them to keep as many options open as possible. From there, 
Blücher could either organize a definitive retreat by reaching Liège by way of Louvain, 
or rejoin Wellington, who was a single day’s march away. On the same day, Napoléon 
chose to separate his right wing, of some 30,000 men, which Grouchy had commanded at 
Ligny. With this detachment, the marshal could either mount a savage pursuit against the 
Prussians’ rear, without worrying about what became of the rest of their army, or keep 
the Prussian army as a whole from meeting the Anglo-Dutch; or carry out both these two 
objectives of pursuit and blocking to the extent that they were compatible.  
 
What actually occurred is that Grouchy set off after the Prussians, who intentionally 
slowed one of their corps, led by Thielemann. On 18 June, the marshal joined battle at 
Wavre against just this rear guard. Meanwhile, the advance guard, with Bülow and Pirch, 
marched unobstructed to Waterloo, and ploughed into the French right on the afternoon, 
early enough to help Wellington who was not in an easy position.16 Having missed their 
chance the first time because of Wellington’s inertia, the allies succeeded in 
concentrating their forces the second time thanks to Blücher’s recovery. It is unlikely that 
Grouchy would have brought the French victory in a Waterloo battle that included Bülow 
and Pirch, but if he had been there instead of them, he would have given Napoléon the 
numerical advantage needed to defeat Wellington. As it was, each commander fielded 
70,000 men, and equality favored Wellington, who had chosen to fight from a strong 
defensive position, as he had done to his advantage so often before. 
 
As already indicated, a major problem of the campaign is to decide what Napoléon 
intended to achieve with Grouchy’s detachment. And this is closely connected with 
another problem, which is to decide how Napoléon interpreted the battle of Ligny. To 
what extent did he overestimate the extent of his victory, and misjudge the direction of 
their retreat? Clausewitz (p. 107-109 and 146-148) claims that he made mistakes on both 
counts, and this has dominated the literature ever since. Let us review the evidence which 
bears on the two questions. 
                                                 
16 Although Thielemann finally had to surrender Wavre, he had fulfilled his role by holding back the enemy 
for half a day. Clausewitz, then a colonel, served as his chief of staff. 
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Napoléon’s initial orders to Grouchy on 17 June were oral, and neither the Mémorial nor 
the marshal’s Mémoires are reliable enough to enable a reconstruction of them.17 
Clausewitz, in his chapter XXXVII, claims that Napoléon entrusted Grouchy with a 
simple mission of pursuit. This, together with an error that Napoléon made concerning the 
direction of the Prussian retreat, would cleanse the marshal of all responsibility for the 
next day’s rout – busy in the east, Grouchy could not at the same time lend a hand to 
Napoléon. The conclusion seems inescapable if one accepts the premises; but Clausewitz 
has no more than hints to establish those premises, and to this day his supporters have not 
substantially improved the argument.18 As he had done with Ney, Napoléon charges 
Grouchy with responsibility for the defeat, claiming in the Mémorial (p. 245) that he 
should have been on the Waterloo battleground. French military writers have often taken 
this position, while softening it with additional reproaches against Napoléon, and still 
more against his chief of staff Soult.19 A good deal of this is transparent apologetics; 
however, there are also historians without any nationalist stake, such as the 20th-Century 
British general Fuller (1951-1956, ch. 18), who conclude that Grouchy ended up in a 
place he should not have been.20 None in the present group of commentators accept 
Clausewitz’s narrow interpretation of the orders of 17 June. By their reading, unsure of 
whether the Prussians had been truly beaten, Napoléon would have asked Grouchy to 
protect him from any possible intrusion by them into his next battle. He would thus have 
entrusted Grouchy with a role of blocking or interposing at the same time as pursuing. 
This wider interpretation obviates the problem of what precisely Napoléon thought of the 
direction of the Prussian retreat. There were two possibilities: either the entire Prussian 
force had moved east, in which case the chase would also serve as interposition; or else 
the enemy was dispersed, with some forces taking the dangerous way to the west, in 
which case Grouchy should prioritize the objective of blocking over that of pursuit. This 
                                                 
17 Compiled by his descendants, Grouchy’s Mémoires discuss these instructions at length, but the effort at 
exculpation is so blatant that it is impossible to take them seriously. 
18 Even the careful study by Hofschröer (1998-1999) falls far from making Clausewitz’s case compelling.  
19 Mauduit (1847) eloquently illustrates the beginning of this line of interpretation, the first of many to 
blame the weakness of Soult and the staff in general. 
20 Here Fuller joins forces with Houssaye (1905-1906), a classic of the French rehabilitation literature. 
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line has no more solid proof than the other. What is known of the 17 June does not permit 
a clear winner in this interpretative contest. 
 
The first written communication that follows the oral commands of 17 June is a letter 
dictated to Bertrand, received by Grouchy shortly after he set off. Both interpretations 
can find something in it, the first because it sends the marshal towards Gembloux, i.e., to 
the east, and, even worse, towards Namur, which distanced him from the Prussians; and 
the second because it directs him to report on Blücher’s maneuvers and his possible 
intention to join Wellington.21 From Gembloux, where he did not arrive before late 
evening, Grouchy replied to Napoléon with a revealing dispatch. This shows that he had 
at last understood that Wavre was one of the Prussian destinations, but not yet that it was 
the only one. Grouchy also brings up the possibility of an enemy movement towards 
Wellington, and adds that he would try to prevent it from occurring, which lends some 
support to the view that the conversation of 17 June had suggested interposition as a 
goal.22 Although the marshal’s letter arrived at 2:00 in the morning, the staff’s reply was 
not sent before 10:00, in which we can see definite evidence of ill-functioning. On behalf 
of Napoléon, Soult commanded Grouchy to make all haste to Wavre, pushing back any 
Prussians he found as he approached the principal army. “His Majesty desires that you 
direct your movements to Wavre, in order to come closer to us, and to cooperate with our 
operations”.23 The minority line uses this sentence to argue that Napoléon wanted to have 
Grouchy participate in the battle of Waterloo (see, e.g., Fuller, 1951-1956, ch. 18). But 
Clausewitz countered the charge in advance, underlining that it was too late to send any 
orders to Grouchy; in fact, the marshal did not receive them until the afternoon of 18 
June, by which time he had been trapped at Wavre by Thielemann, and Pirch had nearly 
reached Mont-Saint-Jean. 
 
Regardless of what can be made of the last dispatch, somewhat confused and certainly 
too late, the strategy was clear in itself. Upon his arrival at Gembloux, Grouchy had to 
                                                 
21 Cited by Mauduit (1847-2006, p. 142) and subsequent authors, Bertrand’s letter is missing from 
Clausewitz, which weakens his chapter XXXVII. 
22 We use Mauduit’s (1847-2006, p. 160-161) version of this letter. Fuller (p. 285-286) summarizes it 
accordingly, while Grouchy’s Mémoires (LV, p. 58-59) distance themselves significantly from the text.  
23 The letter from Soult appears in Clausewitz (p. 141), as do all the subsequent dispatches. 
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arrange to block the Prussians’ move towards Wellington instead of continuing to chase 
them. Fuller proposes an itinerary consisting of a march to Wavre from the west; thus, the 
marshal might intercept the first corps heading to Waterloo. Clausewitz (p. 143) also 
thinks that the westward march was the best strategy, agreeing for once with the 
Mémorial (p. 238-240), which first said that very thing.24 It therefore appears that on the 
level of objective rationality, all the interpreters are in agreement. What divides them is 
how to apportion subjective rationality between the actors on the basis of their beliefs, 
and this conclusion is impossible to reach simply from the documents we have surveyed.  
 
We will discuss the final battle only briefly. On 17 June, after the battle of Quatre-Bras, 
Wellington withdrew his troops to within about ten kilometers of Brussels, on the Mont-
Saint-Jean plateau, whose value for defensive combat he had already spotted.25 Partly 
hidden along the crest, the Anglo-Dutch could fire upon their opponents almost at leisure, 
while the attackers were hemmed in by solid buildings – farms and convents – in the 
center and on both flanks. On 18 June, rain delayed the French attack until 11:30, and 
hindered the artillery preparation that Napoléon was accustomed to implement before 
attacking. For this reason and others, the first offensive, directed against the center of the 
Anglo-Dutch line, was a complete rout. Several historians, including Fuller, conclude that 
with such a bad start Napoléon should have given up fighting the moment he heard of the 
arrival of the Prussians, that is around 3:30 p.m.26 By moving to the defensive, he might 
have saved his army and fled with it back to France. But he did not. He tried to settle the 
outcome with a sequence of thrusts to the enemy’s center, while simultaneously trying to 
close the gaps that the Prussians made in his right wing. While acknowledging the 
consistency of this battle plan, the specialists have judged it simplistic and moreover 
dangerous, given the frail right flank, and above all the stunningly feeble tactical 
execution. Leaving aside the full succession of attacks, we will single out the last and 
most famous, which is the engagement around 7:30 of the Old Guard, the last available 
                                                 
24 Houssaye (1905-1961, p. 294-295) explains the desirable path. Grouchy would leave Gembloux to the 
west, marching to Mousty and Ottignies, where he would cross the Dyle and follow the river’s left bank. 
25 It would be more accurate to call the battle after Mont-Saint-Jean, where it took place, than after the 
neighboring village of Waterloo, but Wellington wanted that name to be chosen. The Germans – 
Clausewitz among them – have long preferred to call the battle after the farm of Belle-Alliance, where 
Blücher and Wellington met on the evening of 18 June. 
26 Roberts (2005) puts the best moment for withdrawal even earlier. 
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reserve. Followed by many others, Clausewitz believes that this was an absolutely 
hopeless move: he goes as far as to claim that Napoléon no longer truly knew what he 
was doing (p. 158). 
 
The moment has arrived for analytically reconsidering the campaign’s main junctures. At 
three key moments – 17 June, around midday on 18 June, and in the final hours of the 
same day – Napoléon could have departed from the line of events that his previous 
decisions had set in motion, yet he did not. Was this evidence of inertia or lack of 
reflection – in which case he would no longer conform even to subjective rationality? Or 
is it a failure to correctly appreciate the situation at hand, in which case this form of 
rationality at least could be salvaged? Or is it the case that Napoléon did appropriately 
assess the situation by the criterion of objective rationality, and simply accepted the 
immense risks that this assessment made clear? Essentially, Clausewitz interprets the 
engagement of the Old Guard as irrationality pure and simple, and the dismembering of 
the army after Ligny as a subjectively rational action based on a false belief. He is more 
cautious in handling Napoléon’s decision to continue the battle despite the threatening 
Prussian advance. At this point, he realizes that a taste for risk exacerbated by the 
circumstances may be consistent not only with subjective but also with objective 
rationality.27 
 
The diagnosis is complicated by Napoléon’s objectives, which were not of the usual 
military kind. He needed not just to win the campaign, but to win it absolutely; a weak 
victory would not have saved France from being invaded and his regime from collapsing. 
The two goals that Clausewitz usually assigns to war – destruction of the enemy forces 
and the political advantage that can be taken from the actions, whether victorious or not – 
were firmly bound together.28 The Borodino battle of the Russian campaign, as 
reinterpreted in On War (IV, 12), makes this clear by way of contrast. There, Napoléon 
refused to engage his reserves against Kutuzov, consciously giving up a more complete 
                                                 
27 See Clausewitz, p. 157. This is a brilliant insight for a time when the concept of risk-attitude was not yet 
separated from those of risk or uncertainty; see Mongin (2009). 
28 The tension between these two goals of war can be seen throughout On War, and Aron’s (1976, ch. III) 
commentary brings it even more clearly to light.  
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victory that was otherwise within his reach. He was justified in holding back his limited 
forces, says Clausewitz, because he meant to enter Moscow in such obvious superiority 
that the tsar would beg him for peace. Borodino illustrates how a long-term political 
objective can diverge from the short-term military objective; by contrast, at Waterloo 
there was nothing to be gained from restraint, and the political and military objectives 
were strictly identical.29 
 
Even the brutal sacrifice of the Guard is more ambiguous than it first appears. Recent 
military analysis permits us to reconsider the battle’s last phase. The partial fall of the 
Anglo-Dutch center around 6:30 afforded Napoléon his best chance of the day. Had he 
launched the Guard precisely at this moment, rather than an hour later, fate, perhaps, 
would have turned in his favor.30 This purely tactical reasoning should be contrasted with 
an interpretation that has sometimes been put forward: that taking defeat to be certain, 
Napoléon found it appropriate to finish his legend with some desperate, grandiose 
gesture. This is a wild suggestion, yet it is not incompatible with the former, purely 
tactical, interpretation; what both have in common is that they deepen the account of the 
actor’s goals in order to dispel the impression that he acted irrationally. 
 
The decision to divide the army created difficulties of a spatial and material nature that 
cannot be overcome simply by reconsidering Napoléon’s ultimate goals. Since the 
unexpected northward movement of the Prussians made it impossible for Grouchy to 
carry out both the blocking and pursuit missions, one can attempt to salvage Napoléon’s 
rationality by emphasizing either his misperception of the retreat (Clausewitz’s solution), 
or his prioritizing interposition over pursuit in the orders to Grouchy (Fuller’s). As we 
have seen, the conflicting hypotheses are loosely formulated and we have no firm 
evidence to rely on to decide between them. A proper model of the Emperor’s choices 
should help on both scores. Not only will it make each alternative logically more definite, 
but, if it works well, it will discriminate between them, thus acting as a substitute for the 
missing data. 
                                                 
29 Herbert-Rothe (2005) also compares the two battles of Waterloo and Borodino.  
30 This idea comes from Roberts (2005, p. 95). 
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3. A game-theoretic model of the decision of 17 June 1815 
 
In the following, we model only the actions of Napoléon, Grouchy and Blücher, ignoring 
Wellington – a choice which can be defended on the ground that he remained fixed at 
Mont-Saint-Jean after bringing his men there on 17 June. In a more debatable 
simplification, we give Blücher only two possible actions: 
B1, march north, then go westward to join Wellington, 
B2, march north, then go eastward to return to Germany. 
We omit a third possibility, B3, which would consist of marching straight east to 
Germany. This brings the analysis closer to the actual choice of the Prussians, who did 
not take B3 into consideration. The omission is more debatable from Napoléon’s point of 
view, since he initially expected B3 to occur. However, it would be awkward to formalize 
the revision of beliefs that took place on 17 and 18 June, and we will assume that, even 
on Clausewitz’s interpretation, Napoléon is at all times uncertain between B1 and B2, 
instead of reaching this state of uncertainty only after initially believing in B3. 
 
No less schematically, two states of the world are possible: 
E1, Blücher is badly weakened, 
E2, Blücher is not badly weakened. 
Before knowing which state is realized, Blücher therefore has four strategies at his 
disposal: 
(Bi, Bj) = if E1, then Bi; if E2, then Bj, i, j, = 1, 2. 
(By definition, a strategy is a function that associates actions to states of the world 
recognizable by the player.)  
 
On the French side, we make another gross simplification by integrating Grouchy into 
Napoléon, treating them as though the latter were in fact the sole decider. It is somewhat 
paradoxical that this is less contestable from the marshal’s own view point – his 
Mémoires describe him as a simple executor of orders – than from the point of view of 
Napoléon and his staff officers, who overloaded him with complex instructions. Not only 
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does it facilitate the game-theoretic analysis to bring the number of players to two, but we 
thereby eschew the difficulty of handling conditional instructions such as the following: 
chase the Prussian rear-guard if it does not appear that the advance-guard is moving to 
join the Anglo-Dutch force, drive westward in the opposite case. Yet the minority 
position à la Fuller would be best formalized by analyzing Grouchy just in terms of such 
strategies. 
 
Thus fused with Grouchy, the player Napoléon has three possible actions: 
S1, keep the army together, 
S2, detach Grouchy’s forces and send them to block Blücher’s path to Wellington, 
S3, detach Grouchy’s forces and send them in Blücher’s pursuit. 
Now technically reinterpreted, blocking (or interposition) means that the clash between 
Grouchy and Blücher will occur if Blücher goes west (case S2B1) and not if Blücher goes 
east (S2B2), while pursuit means that the clash will occur if Blücher goes the latter way 
(case S3B2) and not if he goes the former (S3B1). With these definitions, Grouchy’s 
behavior becomes, as intended, mechanical. He rushes where Napoléon commands, and 
engages in battle or not depending on whether or not he meets Blücher there. Whereas 
Blücher learns in the interim stage which state of the world is realized, Napoléon does 
not, and his strategies are therefore constant functions across the states; that is, they are 
identical to his actions S1, S2, S3. 
 
The following probability parameters represent Napoléon’s beliefs: 
 k, the probability that Blücher is badly weakened by his defeat at Ligny; 
 l, the probability of victory for Napoléon’s consolidated army against a united 
Wellington and Blücher, supposing Blücher was not badly weakened (we will 
take l to be 0 in a simplified variation); 
 l, the probability of victory for Napoléon’s consolidated army against a united 
Wellington and Blücher supposing Blücher was badly weakened; 
 l, the probability of victory for Napoléon without Grouchy against a united 
Wellington and Blücher, supposing Blücher was badly weakened; 
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 m, the probability of victory for Napoléon without Grouchy, and against only 
Wellington, regardless of the state of Blücher’s forces.  
It is automatic to suppose that l > l and that l, m > l. Other less obvious inequalities will 
have to be added to reach a solution. 
 
The model assigns trivial values to all other relevant probability parameters. Thus, it 
gives a value of 1 to: 
 the probability of victory for Napoléon’s entire army against Wellington alone, 
 the probability of Grouchy’s victory against Blücher, supposing that Blücher was 
badly weakened. 
And it gives a value of 0 to: 
 the probability of victory for Napoléon, without Grouchy, against a united 
Wellington and Blücher, supposing that Blücher was not badly weakened; 
 the probability of victory for Grouchy against Blücher, supposing that Blücher 
was not badly weakened. 
 
It seems inelegant to have so many 0s and 1s; however, in experimenting with more 
general assumptions, we have found that these do not appreciably change the 
conclusions. And the Mémorial – although obviously a suspect source – does suggest we 
take extreme values here. For example, it claims that Grouchy’s detachment was strong 
enough to “topple the Prussian rear-guard in whatever position it took” (p. 239). By this 
token, it is comparatively moderate to assign probability 1 to Grouchy’s victory over 
Blücher conditional on Blücher being weakened. Still from the Mémorial, “if Grouchy 
had been on field and time had permitted the French army to deploy itself for battle”, one 
after the other the Emperor would have undone the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies (p. 
245). Again cautiously, we reserve this probability 1 of victory for the case of Napoléon’s 
entire army fighting Wellington alone. 
 
The model also includes the following utility values, which reflect Napoléon’s 
evaluations, just as the probability values reflected his beliefs: 
 a1, the utility of victory against Wellington, 
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 a2, the utility of victory against Blücher, 
 b1, the utility of defeat against Wellington, 
 b2, the utility of defeat against Blücher, 
 c, the utility of no confrontation. 
 
Nothing substantial is added if we assume that victories give positive utility, while 
defeats are negative: 
a1 > 0 > b1, a2 > 0 > b2. 
However, in a more debatable assumption, we will freely sum the numbers thus defined. 
In particular, 
a1 + a2 = the utility of victory against Wellington and Blücher together 
b1 + b2 = the utility of defeat against Wellington and Blücher together 
In other words, Napoléon’s victory against his two opponents at Mont-Saint-Jean would 
have the same value as his beating Wellington alone on this field, accompanied by 
Grouchy’s beating Blücher’s forces elsewhere; and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the 
defeats of the French at the hands of both enemies.  
 
We must still evaluate the situation in which Grouchy and Blücher do not meet. This 
receives the value c = 0 in the case (S3B1) where Blücher marches west and Grouchy 
pursues him in vain, and the value a2 – with  a parameter between 0 and 1 – in the 
case (S2B2) where Blücher marches east and Grouchy engages in a futile block. The 
second case differs from the first in that a Prussian retreat without combat represents an 
additional victory for the French, albeit a much lesser one than would have occurred had 
Blücher been beaten on the field again.  
 
All that remains in order to represent the situation as a normal or strategic form game is 
to define Napoléon’s and Blücher’s payoffs for the various outcomes. Using the 
probabilities k, l, l, l, m and the utilities a1, a2, b1, b2, c, a2, we calculate Napoléon’s 
payoffs by the customary rule of expected utility. Blücher’s payoffs will be supposed to 
be algebraically opposite to Napoléon’s. In technical terms, this is a zero-sum game, 
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which reflects the nature of this – although not every – military campaign.31 One might 
argue, however, that the game is not classically zero-sum. Being also a game of 
incomplete information, it entails opposite values for expected utilities payoffs, which 
means that an assumption is made on the probabilities as well as the final payoffs.  
 
We now sketch the resolution, leaving the details for the appendix. The argument will 
emphasize three expected utility payoffs, denoted V1, V2, V3 in the game matrix below 
(the full matrix is given in the appendix): 
 
 B1B1 B1B2 B2B1 B2B2
S1 V1    
S2   V2  
S3 V3    
 
The first step is to associate with each of Napoléon’s strategies the minimum payoff it 
can bring, taking account of Blücher’s response; this is the strategy’s security payoff. For 
S1, the minimizing strategy is B1B1 and the security payoff is V1; for S2, they are B2B1 and 
V2; and for S3, B1B1 and V3. The last two conclusions follow from our definitional 
assumptions, but the first requires further optional assumptions regarding the utility 
values as well as l, l, . These boil down to an algebraically precise statement that l and l 
are bounded from above.32 
 
The second step compares the strategies S1, S2, S3, supposing that each brings in its 
security payoff. The largest of the three numbers – his maxmin – is the greatest amount 
that Napoléon can guarantee himself, regardless of what Blücher does against him. We 
will assume that he plays the strategy associated with this value. The comparison between 
                                                 
31 Following the previous analysis, at Borodino Napoléon did not aim at Kutuzov’s total annihilation. 
Unless the payoffs are redefined, a zero-sum game would therefore not correctly represent the strategic 
interaction of the two adversaries. Haywood (1954) also underlines that not every battle is appropriately 
modeled as a zero-sum game. 
32 B2B1 minimizes the payoff of S1 if and only if (a1 + a2 – b1 – b2)/(a1 + a2 – b1 – b2) > l, l′. As  grows, the 
central expression increases towards 1, thus binding l, l less and less. This is not a very constraining 
assumption. 
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S1 and S2 depends on the inequality V1 < V2, which is equivalent to a joint restriction on k, 
l, m and the utility values. This restriction is pleasantly simplified when l = 0.33 The 
comparison between S3 and S2 depends on the inequality V3 < V2, which follows from a 
joint restriction on k, m,  and some utility values.34 On the basis of these conditions, we 
conclude that V2 is Napoléon’s maxmin and that he plays S2. 
 
The third step is to investigate Blücher’s strategies, B1B1, B1B2, B2B1, B2B2, calculating 
security payments for each, and finding the highest of these four numbers, i.e., Blücher’s 
maxmin, as well as the corresponding strategy. Without further parameter restrictions, 
these are V2 and B2B1. Making the same behavioral assumption as for Napoléon, we 
conclude that Blücher plays B2B1. 
 
The resulting outcome (S2, B2B1) satisfies von Neumann and Morgenstern’s solution 
concept for zero-sum two-person games. This is not a genuinely interactive concept; 
rather, as the previous two paragraphs have illustrated, it applies an individual rationality 
argument twice over, rationality being identified with prudence (each player protects 
himself against the opponent’s most damaging strategy). However, it is a well-known 
result – holding somewhat more generally than for zero-sum two-person games – that a 
solution so defined is also a Nash equilibrium, i.e., a pair of mutually optimal responses, 
and conversely.35 That is to say, S2 is Napoléon’s best response to Blücher’s choice of 
B2B1, and B2B1 is Blücher’s best response to Napoléon’s choice of S2. We could have 
found the solution (S2, B2B1) just by computing best responses, but this easier method 
would have been harder to justify in terms of individual rationality strictly conceived.  
 
                                                 
33 We derive V1 < V2 from m > k(1 – ld) + ld, putting d = (a1 – b1 + a2 – b2) / (a1 – b1). This is a substantial 
and constraining assumption, which is simplified as m > k when l = 0. To ensure that the right-hand side is 
between 0 and 1, we also impose that ld < 1 – another bound on l – and that m > 0, k < 1. 
34 A sufficient condition for V3 < V2 is that m > k(1 – )a2 / (1 – k)(a1 – b1). The right-hand side is less than 
1 if a1 – b1 > a2 and either k < ½ or  > k. The first assumption is fully justified in the context of 17 June. 
Both of the latter two enter the historical explanation merely as conjectures. There are other sufficient 
conditions available. 
35 See Nash (1950) and Luce and Raiffa (1957, appendix 2). 
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The chief tool of zero-sum, two-player games is the minimax theorem, but this is not 
directly usable here.36 We need to show that Napoléon’s maxmin payoff is equal to the 
algebraic opposite of Blücher’s maxmin payoff for the initial – so-called pure – strategies 
of the two players. The theorem would have secured the equality only for the more 
numerous – so-called mixed – strategies, which select randomly from between the pure 
strategies by means of some probability distribution. Hence the need for a computational 
proof (provided in the appendix). 
 
In the limiting case l = 0, some of the parametric conditions vanish, while V1 > V2 
becomes equivalent to the inequality m > k, which is easier to interpret in the form 1 – k > 
1 – m, since this emphasizes the risks taken by Napoléon. In words, the risk that Blücher 
is not badly weakened must be greater than the risk of losing a duel against Wellington. 
This comparison is the core of our account of Napoléon’s deliberation on 17 June. 
Napoléon would first discard S3 because this strategy led to the worst possible loss, 
greater than the loss incurred under S1.37 Then Napoléon comes to the truly difficult 
choice, that between S1 and S2, and resolves it in favor of S2 after comparing the two risks 
just described. Had he really gone through these reflections, he would have acted 
prudently, not as the gambler of the legend. He had to face the unpleasant possibility that 
Blücher, having weathered Ligny better than expected, would defeat Grouchy; but he 
could at least exclude the worse possibility that Blücher would join forces with 
Wellington against him alone.  
 
A passage of the Mémorial (p. 239) suggests the relatively low value for 1 – m we need 
for the reasoning: the Emperor’s remaining forces were enough to “topple the Anglo-
Dutch army” despite a slight numerical disadvantage. Unfortunately, it says nothing to 
suggest that 1 – k was large, except perhaps in the following, roundabout way. Had 
Napoléon believed the Prussians truly diminished, he would have turned different 
reproaches on Grouchy. In the already cited passage of p. 245, he describes himself 
                                                 
36 Due to von Neumann (1928), this theorem owes its fame to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944-1947). 
37 Observe that dominance reasoning does not suffice to eliminate S3. Recall that one strategy is dominated 
by another if it returns a smaller payoff for all the opponents’ responses, in all states of the world. Our 
game does not give dominated strategies to Napoléon, but it does to Blücher; see the appendix. 
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beating Wellington and Blücher one after the other, and he keeps the final victory over 
the Prussians for himself, leaving it to Grouchy to pin them down while he was finishing 
the Anglo-Dutch. Such a chain of events only makes sense if Blücher was not already 
annihilated by his defeat at Ligny.38 
 
How does the model impact Clausewitz’s position? Clausewitz maintains that Napoléon 
dispatched Grouchy for a chase (S3) even though, from the model, his only sensible 
choice was between dispatching Grouchy for interposition (S2) and keeping the army 
together (S1). As can be checked, the conditions for getting the security payoffs 
associated with S1, S2, S3 are mild or definitional, and maxmin reasoning excludes S3 
merely on the basis of a definitional inequality (V1 > V3 follows from l′ > l′′). Thus, 
Clausewitz should claim that Napoléon acted irrationally, contradicting his own 
suggestion that subjective rationality applies here (see section 2 on how Clausewitz 
allotted rationality and irrationality across the campaign). A more consistent but still 
dubious line would be to argue that Napoléon excluded S3, but should have adopted S1 
instead of S2. In the simplified version of the model, this is equivalent to reversing the 
fundamental inequality, i.e., putting 1 – m > 1 – k. However, the Campaign does not 
properly support this restriction. It only says that Napoléon believed the Prussians to be 
badly damaged and was confident he could defeat Wellington without Grouchy. This 
amounts to taking small values for both 1 – k and 1 – m, leaving the comparison 
indeterminate. Altogether, it is seems impossible to articulate Clausewitz’s position in a 
satisfactory way.  
 
What now for the proNapoleonic position? The model clarifies the restrictions that it 
needs for its conclusion, i.e., that Napoléon rationally adopted S2, and this time the 
available accounts roughly support the restrictions. For example, from what Fuller writes, 
the following becomes plausible: a low value for l, fairly large ones for l′ and m, a weak 
one for k, and a moderate abatement . This delivers the solution S2 not only in the 
simplified form of the model, but also in its general form. In sum, from the perspective of 
                                                 
38 Inconclusive as they also are, two already discussed staff documents suggest a low k. On 17 June, 
Bertrand warns Grouchy about Blücher’s remaining possible maneuvers, and Soult’s dispatch of 18 June 
confirms that Napoléon was concerned about an offensive return of the Prussians.  
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this model, the proNapoleonic position offers a logical coherence that Clausewitz’s lacks. 
This is not to deny that it involves a difficulty that the other does not. For it leaves 
unexplained the behavior of Grouchy, who, in our simple dichotomy of chase or block, 
undertook the former instead of the latter, for which he should have received more or less 
explicit commands. Thus, as reconstructed here, the position salvages Napoléon’s 
rationality at the cost of wrecking Grouchy’s. Note however that the other position, as 
reconstructed here, makes the opposite trade-off, which seems worse, given the 
comparative records of Napoléon and Grouchy. 
 
We stressed earlier that the two interpretations can only hypothesize what Napoléon’s 
commands to Grouchy truly were. Because of this empirical limitation, we used the 
model in no less than three functions, all of which involve the same set of parametric 
restrictions. First, the model permitted evaluating the strategies S1, S2, S3; second, it 
established that Napoléon, acting rationally, ordered S2 rather than S3; and third, by the 
same rationality assumption, it explained this alleged fact as well as the observed fact that 
he did not order S1. In standard methodological accounts, the explanatory use of 
rationality assumptions follows on after an allegedly sufficient observational stage; for 
example, as these accounts go, the role of preference maximization is only to explain the 
consumer's demand for a commodity, not to contribute to determining it empirically, 
since market data or questionnaires are sufficient for this purpose. But in our study, as in 
many other historical works, what needs explaining is not fully observed. Equivocal 
reports (here, the testimonies and dispatches) stand for the missing pieces of information 
(here, the oral commands). This is why we also used the model with the function – 
numbered two above – of clarifying the explanandum. This makes the explanatory 
process circular, in contradistinction with the consumers’ demand case, but not 
necessarily viciously or inadequately so. For there is nothing sinister in circular reasoning 
if it makes overall sense of a sufficient amount of sufficiently diverse data (and it is 
important in this respect that Napoléon’s rejection of S1 can be observed). Still, reasoning 
in this style is probably better fitted to assessing the comparative value of existing 
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accounts and arguments than to providing a full-fledged explanation of the facts 
themselves.39 
 
4. Campaign studies and the objections to analytic narratives 
 
In this section, we return to the genre of analytic narratives and argue that it is well suited 
for the study of military topics of the kind exemplified here. As a preliminary step in this 
argument, we review the objections that have commonly been raised against Bates et al. 
(1998), and see how our model fares with respect to them. These objections come from 
historically minded political scientists and sociologists, not historians, yet may reveal 
why the latter have proved so impervious to the new genre. 
 
There have been essentially three lines of criticism: (i) the historical events are poorly 
selected for the purposes of modeling; (ii) the chosen models fail to meet the appropriate 
game-theoretic standards; (iii) game theory and more generally rational choice theories, 
whether formal or not, are marred by so many conceptual difficulties and empirical 
failures that it is dubious to use them in the first place. Elster’s (2000) fierce review of the 
1998 book develops all three objections, and Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal and Weingast 
(2000) reply to him on each count.40 We agree with them that the grand objection (iii) is 
not really to the point. They write against Elster: “His real opponent is rational choice 
theory” (2000, p. 702). Indeed, why should one discuss analytic narratives at all if one 
has good reason to reject the theory on which it depends? To keep the discussion properly 
focused, we must it seems take for granted that rational choice theory, and more 
specifically its formal branches, has at least some degree of relevance. Only thus can one 
proceed to the more informative objections (i) and (ii). These would have to be evaluated 
by a detailed discussion of each case study in the book, but it transpires from the broad 
outline of the controversy that analytic narratives are indeed generally vulnerable to 
them.  
                                                 
39 We pursue this hermeneutical line at greater length in Mongin (2009). 
40 We focus on this early debate because it puts the issues sharply, perhaps at the risk of oversimplification. 
For complementary viewpoints, see the collection of articles in Social Science History (2000), with another 
response by Bates et al., and the symposium in Sociologica (2007); see also the introductory comments in 
Zagare (2011). 
 26
 
Concerning (i), the choice of an event is poor if it involves imprecise boundaries, too 
many actors, or interactions that are too complex. It is also poor when the historical 
documentation is defective, even though the case may be simple in principle. There are 
more than one possible objections like (ii), but as far as game theory goes one can 
usefully distinguish between those which concern the chosen equilibrium concept, and 
those which concern the multiplicity of equilibria once that concept is fixed. Contrary to 
what Bates et al. (1998) and Levi (2002) suggest, it is not so clear that analytic narratives 
require extensive form games and the corresponding special equilibrium concepts. Their 
further suggestion that the multiplicity issue should be handled ex post by some kind of 
data-driven selection is also questionable; whenever possible, it seems better to reduce 
the number of equilibria ex ante by stronger modelling choices. 
 
Our study will no doubt elicit objections similar to those just listed. To those who still 
take objection (iii) to heart, it is worth mentioning that our game-theoretic analysis has an 
advantage over others. We use the Nash equilibrium concept in a class of games – two-
player, zero-sum – for which its appropriateness is least dubious, because equilibrium 
behavior is supported there by an individual rationality argument (specifically based on 
prudence). Moreover, our particular game has no other pure strategy equilibrium than the 
one calculated. This also answers one of the worries contained in objection (ii).  
 
Concerning (ii), it must be added that the model includes a relatively rich description of 
Napoléon’s uncertainties. For one thing, we have probabilized the issues in the payoff 
matrix, so as to reflect Napoléon’s uncertainty regarding the outcome of his battles, once 
every strategic move has been made; and for another, we have endowed Blücher with 
strategies, rather than merely actions, in order to formally capture Napoléon’s uncertainty 
regarding Blücher’s strength after Ligny. The first form of uncertainty is exogenous, but 
the second is strategic and it structures the game, making it a game of incomplete 
information. This is so despite the fact that we do not probabilize Napoléon’s beliefs on 
Blücher’s types, as a full-fledged game of this class would require.41 In the early 
                                                 
41 This answers a technical question raised by Steve Brams and Françoise Forges. 
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literature of analytic narratives, only the first (exogenous) form of uncertainty occurs. To 
Elster’s (2000, p. 293) complaint that they neglect uncertainty, Bates et al. (2000, p. 699-
700) correctly reply that he should have distinguished between the two forms and 
recognized that some of their studies pay attention at least to the first. They express 
reservations on the second form, without fully explaining their grounds. Clearly, there is 
a tension between the adherence to the extensive form and the need for representing in-
depth strategic uncertainty. Our choice of a strategic form is in part prompted by the 
greater ease with which this format can be extended in the uncertainty direction.42 
 
It will no doubt be said that some of our technical assumptions are ad hoc, a criticism that 
borders on objections (ii) and (i). We have already considered one possibility of conflict 
between the game-theoretic model and the historical narrative: Grouchy should count 
among the strategic actors alongside Blücher and Napoléon. If this were done, the 
distinction between strategies and actions would also appear on the French side. 
Napoléon would have the choice of either remotely controlling Grouchy, or of delegating 
to him the power to act according to what he discovered on the terrain. In a game thus 
refined, the ex post inadequate choice of pursuit might become one of the equilibria 
instead of being a deviation from the single equilibrium. We do not dispute that these 
changes would be for the better, and we defend the current model in only two ways: it is 
a decent starting point to illustrate the method, and, within its limits, it seems sufficient to 
assess the conflicting interpretations. 
 
Another possibility of conflict between the model and the narrative has to do with the 
actors’ objectives, but that point does not have much force here. We have already argued 
for the appropriateness of the zero-sum assumption. The further assumption of additive 
utility seems defensible on the very same ground, i.e., that nothing short of a crushing 
victory in the campaign could fulfill Napoléon’s objectives. The number and order of 
battles mattered little to him as long as he achieved this final result. However, we have 
                                                 
42 However, some of Zagare’s (2011) work uses perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and thus takes the step of 
integrating strategic uncertainty with the extensive form. 
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not taken the idea to its extreme, since we added only the final utilities – not the expected 
ones, which would have altered the conclusions significantly. 
 
It remains to consider objection (i) more directly by discussing our case selection. The 
problem here is that a case may involve too much relational complexity – or, even if this 
is not the case, may be too poorly documented – for the formal theory to have any real 
bite. This is more likely to be realized when the event is taken broadly across time and 
space, and some of the cases in Bates et al. (1998) are indeed questionable on this score: 
Elster has a point here. Accordingly, we have selected a very small-scale event, whose 
context, the Waterloo campaign, is extremely well documented. We will now generalize 
from this example to the claim that military activities, and specifically military 
campaigns, offer a suitable topic for analytic narratives, in the sense of barring objection 
(i). This will involve us in surveying six relevant aspects of this topic. 
 
First of all, the hierarchical nature of military organization makes it acceptable to 
concentrate the study on the decisions made by a few key individuals – typically, the 
general-in-command, his staff and principal lieutenants. In actual fact, the human 
material of an army never has the suppleness that makes top-down instructions fully 
effective. Our model integrates these “frictions” – Clausewitz’s famous term (On War, I, 
VII) – by way of probabilizing the consequences of the actions of the decision-makers it 
selects. The limitation of this method is that it rules out some possibly relevant 
interactions. For example, to treat discipline among the rank-and-file as a stochastic 
phenomenon is to forget that it depends on a range of activities on the leaders’ part – 
demonstrations of courage, promises, threats and exhortations; ideally, these activities 
should enter the definition of action sets in the model. However, the neglected 
interactions are not always significant to the same degree, and the empirical data may 
serve here as a touchstone. When an army threatens to fall apart modelers must address 
the relation between the leaders and the troops; when it obeys orders, as it did on 18 June 
before the tragic denouement, they may pass over it.  
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In the second place, the classic distinction between strategy and tactics offers a useful 
heuristic to select which decisions by the key actors should enter the model. According to 
standard military treatises, strategy concerns the organization of the movements of the 
army in a campaign, aimed at a battle or a linked collection of battles, in pursuit of the 
overall victory; tactics concerns the movements of the army within a given battle so as to 
win it.43 Such a contrast reflects a means-ends hierarchy, a spatio-temporal difference – 
the movements of a campaign being more wide-ranging than those of a battle – and lastly 
an organizational difference – the general-in-command being solely responsible for 
strategy, whereas he shares or delegates responsibilities on tactics. The June 1815 
sequence of events illustrates this threefold analysis neatly. On the basis of his 
overarching plan of campaign, Napoléon entrusted two subordinates, Ney and Grouchy, 
with the supervision of battles that were to be fought in distant locations. Since Napoléon 
was acting in accordance with the classic military distinction, a modeler can adopt it in 
turn. That is, the fact that the actors themselves act on a given concept guarantees that it 
is not merely convenient for the modeler to employ it, but also properly explanatory. The 
related point is that campaigns, rather than battles or other military events, are the natural 
objects of military analytic narratives.44 
 
Third, the military goal is classically determined from without and once and for all – to 
win the battle or to achieve victory in the campaign, as the case may be. According to 
older military definitions, the former occurs with the final occupation of the field, and the 
latter with the conquest of a province or stronghold. The modern conception of a 
victorious campaign or battle is more abstract, holding it to be the destruction of the 
opposing forces, or, failing that, their significant weakening – along with their own 
admission of the fact if possible. This much is suggested by On War, although 
Clausewitz’s precise meaning has been debated.45 The plural understanding of victory 
gives rise to an ambiguity that can be worrying for the ordinary narrator, and hence also 
                                                 
43 This is essentially the distinction made by On War, I, II.  
44 When a single decision is at issue, as in Haywood’s (1954) Pacific example, the distinctions between 
strategy and tactic, or campaign and battle, of course vanish.  
45 Arguing from On War (VIII), Aron (1976) concludes that Clausewitz promoted a novel conception of 
victory. But Paret (1992, p. 106) makes it clear that this is not entirely the case 
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for the analytic narrator.46 But even if we grant that there are some exceptions, it remains 
broadly correct that the military context permits us to fix subjective goals relatively 
easily. 
 
The fourth point is closely related to the third. Schematizing the teleological side of the 
reasons for action helps us to refine the cognitive side and to locate the desired 
explanation there. Formal rational choice theories attain their peak inferential capacity 
when they are precised in this way.47 For example, by assuming that firms maximize their 
profits, economists are able to connect the oligopolistic structure of a market with the 
conjectures that each firm makes about its competitors’ strategic moves. Or, again, by 
assuming that stock market traders maximize their expected utility, and that they are 
identically risk-averse, they can relate asset prices to the differences in the beliefs held by 
these traders. Both applications illustrate the logical power of models that postulate 
simple objectives and keep them fixed throughout. Historians of military campaigns 
follow this one-sided method in their own way when, proceeding from the assumption 
that victory is desirable to the leaders, they focus explanation on these leaders’ beliefs 
and risk-attitudes. If their explanations seem incomplete or mutually discrepant, the role 
of the military analytic narrative is simply to sharpen them and facilitate adjudication 
between them. 
 
Fifth, even a campaign decision of the highest degree of complexity is in principle to be 
assessed in terms of its final consequences on the field. An idealized general-in-command 
would apply backward reasoning, passing from the evaluation of the final consequences 
to that of the immediate consequences, and eventually of the initial decision. Seen from 
this consequentialist perspective, the choice made on 17 June was relevant only in 
relation to the chances of victory or defeat it established for 18 June. A decision of that 
kind necessarily also exhibits procedural features, such as complying with the art of war, 
or involving more or less panache; but from a consequentialist perspective these do not 
                                                 
46 Even some Napoleonic events are not easy to classify. With Borodino, Eylau is the classic example of an 
ambiguous victory, and Tolstoy in War and Peace goes as far as to claim these two battles for the Russian 
camp. 
47 Davidson (2004, p. 26) claims that the explanatory asymmetry between desires and beliefs is structural, 
but others see it only as a contingent property of the given explanations. 
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matter unless they influence the final outcome. Many military campaigns can be 
described plausibly by ignoring such procedural features, and this again makes them a 
promising terrain for applying formal rational choice theories, which are consequentialist 
throughout. 
 
The five features listed thus far should be contextualized. Both military activity itself and 
its strategic theorizing have changed dramatically since Napoléon’s time.48 The concept 
of the masterminded campaign that leads to decisive battles is now outdated. The 
indefinite battles of the First World War following the Marne, and the new concept of 
total war thus heralded, as well as the colonial wars, guerrilla combats and other 20th- and 
21st-Century “dirty” wars – all shake the five features to a varying extent. In the other 
time direction, scholars have pointed out that Ancien Regime wars embodied specific 
conceptions of military activity that are equally divergent from the Napoleonic scheme. 
All this suggests that our case, being too well chosen, cannot support a general argument 
for treating military campaigns analytically. 
 
This objection, however, misjudges the role of time. Military campaigns confront formal 
rational choice theories with a continuum of obstacles that are best stated abstractly. 
These theories apply more rigorously as the distinction between war and peace becomes 
clearer, as the goals in each camp come to be more closely aligned, as military decision-
making adheres to a stricter hierarchy, and so on. By exploring this factor of dependency, 
one would likely discover that it is not the time period per se that decides whether or not 
a military analytic narrative is feasible. A more casual review of military history leads to 
the same conclusion, by suggesting promising examples in the mid-20th Century, the 
Ancien Regime or even Ancient Rome, as well as unpromising ones in the mid-19th 
Century.49 Military historians adopting the methodology proposed here would not be in a 
very different position from economists, whose success or failure depends on the areas of 
social interaction to which they apply their maximizing and equilibrium assumptions. 
                                                 
48 On these changes, see, among many others, Earle’s (1943) collection or Aron’s (1976) comments on 
Clausewitz’s heritage. 
49 Compare the campaigns investigated by Fuller (1954-56) on a very broad time range. Some are evidently 
more amenable to rational choice modelling, and there is no such obvious time dependency as may seem at 
first glance. 
 32
 
The sixth and last feature is perhaps the single most important of the list. It is that 
military actions are already viewed as rational or irrational, before these qualifiers appear 
in scholarly work. The actors themselves are the first to adopt them, either ex ante or ex 
post; then, polarized in the same way, come the judgments of witnesses, memoir-writers, 
military instructors, academic historians. As a memoir-writer, Napoléon produced the 
first systematic study of the Waterloo campaign, which prompted those of Clausewitz 
and many further military instructors and academic historians; and on it went, right up to 
the current modest academic essay, which capitalizes abundantly on its predecessors. 
Each step has brought out new information as well as new questions, sometimes 
unexpected.50 That interpretations develop in a wide reflective spiral is common in 
history, but that individual rationality should permeate each reflective stage is not so 
common, and this again singles out military campaigns as relevant objects of analytic 
narratives. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Analytic narratives face three main groups of objections. We have discarded those 
directed at rational choice theory as such, on the grounds that they are uninterestingly 
general; we have discussed some of the more technical ones relative to game theory; and 
finally we confronted head-on what seemed to us the crucial problem, i.e., the choice of 
historical topics suited for the analytic treatment. Taking the view that some cases are 
intrinsically more amenable to this treatment than others, we have offered campaign 
narratives as a favorable example. We emphasize, however, that we mean this only to be 
an example. The list of the previous section is only a step away from a yet more abstract 
argument, which would explore the six features in and of themselves, regardless of their 
military instantiations, and thus permit us to recognize other favorable examples. By and 
large, an analytic narrative works better when the following conditions are met: decision 
units are more definite and come closer to being concrete individuals; the distinction 
                                                 
50 Largeaud (2008) provides a thorough account of how interpretations of Waterloo have succeeded – and 
to an extent generated – each other, on the French scene. One would welcome similar reviews for the 
British and German scenes. 
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between incidental and major decisions is clearer, and the latter are made more 
methodically; the decision-makers’ ends are easier to grasp and separate from their 
beliefs; the reductive consequentialist approach applies more plausibly to the evaluations; 
and, last but not least, the antecedent informal narratives of the same case are more 
permeated with rationality considerations. Some cases in Bates et al. (1998) fit these 
general conditions better than others. However, we must defer this cross-examination and 
a full analysis of the conditions, leaving the present paper at its intermediate level of 
generality.51 Hopefully, what has been said of military applications is sufficient to bring 
the point home that not every analytic narrative is marred by “excessive ambition”, to 
quote Elster’s (2000) derogatory slogan, and that historians should not persist with their 
diffidence about – or, worse, ignorance of – the new genre. 
 
For the more specialized audience of this journal, a word may be added on how analytic 
narratives relate to cliometrics. Prominent among the shared characteristics are the 
orientation of the explanatory work towards specific historical events rather than any 
other explananda,52 the problematizing form of the historical inquiry, as against the 
descriptive or classical narrative forms of traditional history,53 and the application to 
history of formal models that are borrowed or adapted from economic theories broadly 
understood. The most salient difference has to do with the question of measurement. 
Cliometricians are typically busy constructing and investigating past economic quantities, 
with a view to giving a quantitative precision to their causal hypotheses. Analytic 
narrators have only dealt with qualitative data, such as changes in institutional patterns 
and weighty decisions made by individuals or organizations. Against earlier economic 
history, cliometrics asserted itself not so much by promoting the use of quantitative data, 
which was already developed in part of that history, as by recommending a powerful 
                                                 
51 Some comments along the present lines can already be found in Mongin (2010, 2016). A troubling 
suggestion we make there is that analytic narratives tend to work well when traditional narratives of the 
same events already work well. 
52 Even though some cliometricians and analytic narrators endow their respective fields with an inductive 
potential. Thus, Diebolt and Haupert (2016) and Haupert (2016) connect cliometrics with the second 
German historical school, which promoted inductive economics, and Bates et al. (1998) express the hope 
that their models would be applicable across similar historical cases, thus revealing an inductive potential. 
53 See again Diebolt and Haupert (2016) and Haupert (2016) on this. 
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theoretical organization of the data that thus far was entirely missing.54 We here have a 
very different contrast, since analytic narratives fully endorse the need for theory, but do 
not use the data in question. As a straightforward consequence, analytic narratives and 
cliometrics do not borrow from the same theories. The central tool of the former, game 
theory, is exemplary of the mathematics of the qualitative, and although it can combine 
with econometrics or other statistical tools, as some applied economic research testifies, 
this has not happened in analytic narratives. Cliometrics, for its part, makes very little use 
of game theory and other formal versions of rational choice theory when compared with 
the classic triad of microeconomics, macroeconomics and econometrics.55 
 
However, the present state of affairs is perhaps only temporary. There are few analytic 
narratives in existence, and those which are yet to come may enlarge their concerns and 
techniques in the direction of cliometrics. As soon as the field takes a quantitative turn, it 
will become an integrated part of cliometrics.56 To be faithful to their initial intent, these 
future works should remain genuine narratives, although not narratives of the form that 
cliometricians tend to disparage. The single most important message that the 
cliometricians could learn from their fellow analytic narrators is that there are many 
mansions in the Father’s house, and not every narrative is adverse to theoretically 
inspired history. 
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APPENDIX 
 
As stated in the text, the zero-sum game between Napoleon and Blücher has a unique 
equilibrium (S2,B2B1) if some optional conditions hold, beyond those which are 
automatically ensured by the definitions of final payoffs, probabilities and the abatement 
coefficient . The present appendix gives some details on the computation of this 
equilibrium. 
 
Let us label Napoleon's payoffs in the following way: 
 
B1B1 B1B2 B2B1 B2B2
S1 V11 V12 V13 V14
S2 V21 V22 V23 V24
S3 V31 V32 V33 V34
 
 
Each Vij is obtained by an expected utility calculation: 
    ))(1()()1())('1()(' 2121212111 bblaalkbblaalkV   
V12  k l'(a1  a2) (1 l')(b1  b2)  (1 k) a1 a2)  
V13  k(a1  a2)  (1 k) l(a1  a2)  (1 l)(b1  b2)  
V14  a1 a2 
V21  k ma1  (1 m)b1  a2  (1 k) ma1  (1 m)b1  b2  
V22  k ma1  (1 m)b1  a2  (1 k) ma1  (1 m)b1 a2  
V23  k ma1  (1 m)b1 a2  (1 k) ma1  (1 m)b1  b2  
V24  ma1  (1 m)b1  a2 
V31  k l"(a1  a2) (1 l")(b1  b2)  (1 k)(b1  b2)  
V32  k l"(a1  a2)  (1 l")(b1  b2)  (1 k) ma1  (1 m)b1  b2  
V33  k ma1  (1 m)b1  a2)  (1 k)(b1  b2) 
V34  k ma1  (1 m)b1  a2)  (1 k) ma1  (1 m)b1  b2)  
 
The definitions of k, m, l, l', l",  and the sign restrictions on a1, b1, a2, b2 imply a number 
of inequalities between the Vij : 
V11 V31, V21 V31, V12 V32, V22 V32, V14 V24 , 
V22 V21, V21 V23 , V22 V23, V24 V23 , 
V32 V31, V33 V31, V34 V33 . 
 
The strategic analysis on Napoleon's side proceeds as follows. It is the case that: 
V14 V13  and V12  V11 iff  (*) a1 a2  b1  b2a1  a2  b1  b2  l , 
and: 
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V13  V11 iff (*') a1 a2  b1  b2a1  a2  b1  b2  l' . 
We assume both (*) and (*') to hold, thus ensuring that V11 = V1 is the security payoff of 
S1 (cf. fn. 32). By inspecting the definitional inequalities, we observe that V23 = V2 is the 
security payoff of S2 and that V31 = V3 is the security payoff of S3. 
 
Now to compare the three values V1, V2, V3. In view of (*'), the inequality V2 > V1 can be 
obtained from V2 > V13, which is equivalent to: 
(m  k)(a1  b1)  (l  kl)(a1  b1  a2  b2) , 
or: 
(**) m  k(1 ld)  ld , with d  a1  b1  a2  b2
a1  b1
. 
This inequality makes sense only if the right-hand side is between 0 and 1, i.e., only if m 
> 0, k < 1, and 
(**') l 1/d , 
which implies that l < 1. We impose these conditions (cf. fn. 33). Notice that (**) implies 
that m > k, a condition to which we return below.   
 
Since V33 > V3 holds, the inequality V2 > V3 can be obtained from V2 > V33, or 
equivalently: 
(***) m  ( k
1 k )(1)(
a2
a1  b1
) , 
which requires that k < 1. The right-hand side is less than 1 under one of the two 
conditions: 
(***') k  1
2
, a2  a1  b1, 
or: 
(***")   k, a2  a1  b1. 
We assume (***) to hold, as well as either (***') or (***") (cf. fn. 33). Hence, V2 is 
Napoleon's maxmin.  
 
Here are the computations on Blücher's side. From what has just been shown in the last 
paragraphs, -V2 is the security payoff of the conditional strategy B2B1. We will show that 
it is also the maxmin by checking that no other strategy can deliver a higher security 
payoff. 
 
Concerning B1B1: from definitional inequalities, the security payoff is either -V11 or -V21. 
It cannot be -V11 because V11 > V21 would imply a cycle, given that V21 > V2 > V13 > V11; 
so it is -V21, which cannot be the maxmin, given the first inequality in this sequence.  
Concerning B1B2: definitional inequalities entail -V12 or -V22 being the security payoff, 
but neither can be the maxmin because V22 > V2 holds (if -V22 is the security payoff, it 
falls below -V2, and the same if it is -V12, since this implies V12 >V22). 
Concerning B2B2: again from definitional inequalities, either -V14 or -V24 is the security 
payoff, and by a similar argument, V24 > V2 precludes either value from being the 
maxmin. 
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Thus, we conclude that the equilibrium of the game, in the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
sense, is (S2, B2B1).  
 
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium calculation would have reached the same conclusion 
somewhat differently and more quickly. It would have used the fact that Blücher's 
strategies B2B2 and B1B2 are dominated, respectively, by B2B1 and B1B1, once condition 
(*) is granted. So they are discarded from consideration for Napoleon too, and his 
strategy S3 becomes dominated by S2 from (***), (***') or (***"), and definitional 
inequalities. The game is now 2x2, and the remaining conditions, i.e., (*'), (**), (**'), 
ensure that (S2, B2B1) is an equilibrium in the Cournot-Nash sense and that it is unique. 
 
As mentioned in the text, the assumption that l = 0 simplifies the analysis. Then, (*), (*'), 
(**') are trivially satisfied. The binding conditions are (***), (***') or (***"), and (**), 
which reduces to the straightforward inequality m > k. Thus, in this limiting case, the 
necessary condition becomes sufficient.  
 
Not all the probabilities can take extreme values. The conditions make it necessary that m 
> 0, l < 1 and k < 1, with k being further bounded from above and  unrestrained between 
0 and 1, or alternatively k and  being mutually related. Notice that l" is the least 
constrained parameter, being only subjected to the definitional inequalities l', m > l". 
  
It is trivial to find non-extreme values that satisfy all the conditions. For example, take as 
utility parameters: 
a1 1, b1  1, a2 1/2, b2  1/2, 1/2, 
and as probability parameters: 
l  0.1, l'1/2, l"1/3, k 1/3, m  2 /3. 
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Mobilization of French forces 
continued during the campaign.
Artillery, Engineers and trains
numbered 9,500 men.
The advance of Schwenzenberg
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BRUSSELS AND VICINITY, 1815
 WATERLOO CAMPAIGN
Situation Midnight 17-18 June and
Movements Since 16 June 
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